Eventually, corrective feedback is not needed as much (although, as Hoffman points out, even adults need corrective feedback at times). Corrective feedback, such as when one’s egocentric efforts to relieve another’s distress don’t work, leads to behavior which takes the other’s perspective into account. There is clearly the desire to help the other, but from the only point of view that the helping child is aware of: their own point of view.īy late in the second year, children begin to show awareness that the inner states of others may be different from their own states. For example, a child may bring another crying child to her mother instead of the child’s own mother. In quasi-egocentric empathic distress, the child will attempt to help the other in distress, but from their own point of view. There seems to be genuine confusion at this point about who is in distress, therefore the oxymoron “egocentric empathic distress”.īy early in the second year, a sense of self occurs and along with it, quasi-egocentric empathic distress develops. In egocentric empathic distress, which starts to occur at the end of the first year, the reaction to another infant’s distress is mostly the same, except that there is behavior which is meant to reduce their own distress (not the other infant’s distress). The first category, the newborn reactive cry, is likely caused by a “…combination of mimicry and conditioning, with each getting an assist from imitation.” (Hoffman, 2000, p 65) At this point, there is only distress, but no effort to relieve distress. Hoffman has five categories in the development of empathic distress: 1) newborn reactive cry, 2) egocentric empathic distress, 3) quasi-egocentric empathic distress, 4) veridical empathic distress, and 5) empathic distress beyond the situation. Most of the egoistic fears regarding a transition to and maintenance of personal veganism are really nothing more than a fear of the unknown and, very likely in many cases, a lack of self-confidence in men and women. Egoistic motives opposing animal rights would be the desire to maintain the status quo with regard to eating habits, the fear of learning more about the plight of animals (empathic over-arousal), over-estimations of difficulty in transitioning to or maintaining a vegan diet (even though it is very easy), fear of dealing with family and friends after committing to veganism, and, in the case of people whose occupations require animal abuse and killing, giving up their current occupations. My purpose is not to cover or summarize Hoffman’s book or entire theory, but only to provide some of the basic elements and bring forth what I consider to be the most relevant aspects of his theory to the development of empathy for nonhuman beings.Įmpathic Distress Versus Egoistic MotivesĬentral to Hoffman’s theory is the occurrence of empathic distress in response to another’s distress where, 1) empathic distress is associated with helping, 2) empathic distress precedes helping, and 3) observers feel better after helping.Įmpathic distress often competes with egoistic motives. Virtually all of the information on Hoffman’s theory in this essay has been extracted from Hoffman’s book published in 2000 entitled, Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice. Hoffman’s theory is comprehensive, and while much of it is supported by research, Hoffman makes use of many detailed anecdotes from interviews, open-ended research questions, and other sources to “fill in the research gaps” in the comprehensive theory. Cognitive reasoning and justice are especially integrated into Hoffman’s theory in the more advanced stages of empathy development. Martin Hoffman’s theory of moral psychology and development is primarily focused on empathy and empathic distress, but also includes classic conditioning, cognitive reasoning, and principles of caring and justice.
#Martin hoffman at timepiece trading series#
This essay is the third in a series of four essays on moral psychology and development.
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